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文章编号：1672-3104(2017)06-0094-07
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集团控制与上市公司过度负债——基于上证A股制造业上市公司的经验证据
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（1. 中南大学商学院，湖南长沙，410083；
2. 湖南商学院会计学院，湖南长沙，410205）
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摘 要： 以上证A股2011—2014年制造业上市公司面板数据为样本，研究了企业集团内部资本市场中的关联担保与关联资金交易行为对集团控制型上市公司过度负债的作用机理。结果表明：集团控制导致了上市公司过度负债，上市公司接受关联担保在这一过程中具有中介作用，其对外资金配置在集团控制与过度负债的关系中具有正向调节作用。
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关键词： 集团控制；内部资本市场；关联担保；资金配置；过度负债
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Group control and listed companies’ over-indebtedness: Empirical evidence based on SSE A-share manufacturing listed companies
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LI Shihui1, LIN Yong1, HE Yong2
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（1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China;
2. School of Accounting, Hunan University of Commerce, Changsha 410205, China）
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Abstract: Based on data of SSE A share, the present essay studies how internal guarantee or internal capital allocation in internal capital market leads the group-controlled listed companies to over-indebtedness. Results show that the group control brings about over-indebtedness of listed companies, that internal guarantee plays a role as a mediator in the process, and that capital allocation to other group members serves as a moderator in the relation between group control and over-indebtedness.
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Key words: group business; internal capital market; related-party guarantee; capital allocation; over-indebtedness
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